There has been much speculation about whether the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has, or ought to have, a 'threshold' ¢gure for the cost of an additional quality-adjusted life-year above which a technology will not be recommended for use. We argue that it is not constitutionally appropriate for NICE to set such a threshold, which is properly the business of parliament. Instead, the task for NICE is as a 'threshold-searcher' --to seek to identify an optimal threshold incremental cost-e¡ectiveness ratio, at the ruling rate of expenditure, that is consistent with the aim of the health service to maximize population health. This will involve the identi¢cation of technologies currently made available by the National Health Service that have incremental cost-e¡ectiveness ratios above the threshold, and alternative uses for those resources in the shape of technologies not currently provided that fall below the threshold.
Introduction
The quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) is the outcome measure of choice in England and Wales for the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). 1 There has been much speculation about whether NICE has a 'threshold' figure for the cost of an additional QALY above which a technology will not be recommended for use in the National Health Service (NHS), and there has been some suggestion that NICE is dissembling in its denials that such a threshold exists. 2 Retrospective analysis of appraisal determinations in its first year of operation suggested that positive recommendations were in general associated with a cost per QALY of £30,000 or less; higher cost per QALY figures would receive approval only if there were special factors accepted as relevant and not covered by the formal modelling. 3 Attempts to infer what any such threshold might be, based on published appraisal decisions, have identified a general concentration of estimates in the region of £20,000-£30,000 in one study 2 and a suggestion that the threshold might be considerably higher than £30,000 in another. 3 In April 2004, NICE confirmed that interventions with a cost per QALY below £20,000 were likely to be recommended, while the acceptability of therapies between £20,000 and £30,000 per QALY is more likely to depend upon other factors, such as the innovative nature of the therapy. 1 Prior to this, the only published specific threshold came from the Department of Health 4 in which a threshold of £36,000 was set, specific to a risk sharing agreement with the pharmaceutical industry over the provision of disease-modifying drugs for people living with multiple sclerosis.
There are good reasons why it is improper for NICE to apply a specific threshold. NICE's proper function is as a 'threshold-searcher', seeking to identify the optimal threshold that lies somewhere between the least cost-effective technology currently provided and the most cost-effective technology not yet available routinely in the NHS.
It is not constitutionally proper for NICE to determine the threshold or the National Assembly for Wales y and to reach a judgement on whether on balance this intervention can be recommended as a cost-effective use of NHS and PSS resources. 5
The logical implications of NICE's mandate can be made clear in the following way. Consider a rank ordering of all the technologies available to the NHS and the most efficient ways of spending NHS funding, as shown in Figure 1 . Those that have the largest possible impact on health per pound spent are plotted on the left with each addition to health gain falling as people with the best chances of being helped have already been helped. The downward slope continues until the point E is reached, at which the available NHS budget has been used up. The height of the line at this point (Ea) shows the marginal health gain (mhg) from additional expenditure, given the current budget. Its inverse shows the marginal cost-effectiveness of NHS expenditure, or the threshold incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. The total health gain produced by this expenditure is the entire area under the curve. It is the greatest gain in health achievable, given the range of technologies available and the current NHS budget. It requires that this budget is effectively spent by the NHS so that none of the technologies with an mhg less than Ea is used.
If the objective is indeed to maximize the impact of health services on health, then we can approach the defining characteristic of this objective in either one of two ways. We can either speak of a budget that is to be efficiently spent, which entails using all the technologies embodied in the figure up to 0E, which implies the threshold mhg of Ea; or we can speak of a threshold QALY gain per unit of expenditure -Ea, which entails using all technologies whose mhg is higher than Ea, which will (just) require a budget of 0E. The two are equivalent: we may either spend the budget to maximize health (which implies the threshold), or purchase all technologies up to the threshold (which implies the budget). Both produce the same outcome.
Determining the budget is Parliament's business. NICE is neither mandated nor qualified to make judgments about the relative value of public money spent on health care versus education, defence, environment, etc. and, of course, private consumption. But, since determining the threshold is logically equivalent to determining the budget (given the available technologies embodied in the curve), NICE cannot be qualified to pronounce on that either.
Therefore, information about how much an individual or society values improvements in health (i.e. their willingness to pay for a QALY) is not at all relevant to the NICE remit. These values could only be used as the appropriate threshold by NICE if it were also given responsibility to set the NHS budget.
NICE as a threshold-searcher
The information demands of optimizing NHS expenditure are manifestly huge. NICE has incomplete and uncertain information on the mhg function in Figure 1 and, therefore, does not know the value of the threshold. The threshold is neither taken by NICE (from government) nor made by NICE. NICE is neither a threshold-taker nor a threshold-maker. NICE is, in effect, a threshold-searcher, where the threshold is logically implied by the combination of the technologies that are available and the budget, but is not readily visible. Figure 1 assumes the NHS is able to allocate its budget on programmes in order of their health gain per pound spent. Figure 2 explores the more realistic analytical problem for NICE when the current budget is not allocated in this efficient manner. In Figure 2 , the range of technologies in 0E embodies those in the NHS. Let us assume that all are positive and that the least productive one has, as before, an mhg of Ea. However, we now assume that there are many technologies that are not currently provided within the NHS. These technologies are ranked in a separate downward-sloping function to the right of E labelled cf. A composite mhg curve is the horizontal sum of the two lines, Hde, which combines all available technologies: those in use as well as those that could be used but are not, and again orders them by contribution to health gain. It is immediately apparent that NICE confronts three potentially interesting mhgs, the size of none of which it can be sure of. Ea is the actual mhg implied by current use in the NHS. It is what the current 'threshold' would appear to be if a comprehensive assessment were to be made of the ways in which NHS resources are used. Ec is the health gain to be achieved from adopting the best technology not currently in use. Eb is the threshold above which technologies ought to be adopted and below which they ought not. The incorporation of any technology not in current use with an mhg above Eb would represent an increase in health gain as long as it displaces a technology with a lower mgh (in the range E 0 E). The optimal solution is plainly to cease using all those technologies in the range E 0 E on Ha and substitute for them all those in the range EE 00 ( ¼ E 0 E) on cf. The search strategy for NICE is to work within the zone of substitution, defined by E 0 E 00 , identifying technologies in current use that are the least productive uses of current NHS resources, and identifying better value technologies that are not currently provided.
NICE's search strategies
It is not feasible for NICE to examine the costeffectiveness of all interventions to reveal the location of Hde. Instead, NICE adopts a number of strategies consistent with the behaviour to be expected of a threshold-searcher. In collaboration with the Department of Health, it engages in horizon scanning to explore technologies that probably lie in the zone of substitution. NICE also relies upon a broad consultative process with all stakeholders, including the general public, to identify technologies for both investment and disinvestment. The proposals obtained through the consultation process inform which therapies to put forward for review. 6 Within the review process, the appraisal committee's judgments on the cost effectiveness of a new technology must include judgments on the implications for health care programmes for other patient groupsyhow the cost effectiveness of the technology being appraised relates to other intereventions/technologies currently being applied in the NHS.
If this system were to work well, we would expect to see a mixture of investment and disinvestment opportunities being reviewed by NICE. However, in practice almost all NICE appraisals have only considered opportunities for investment, 7 leaving consideration of disinvestment opportunities to local purchasers. While some of the latter have established formal processes for considering local disinvestment and investment decisions, 8, 9 there is substantial variation in both the quality and the degree of transparency in such processes. 10 In view of this, a common evaluative framework producing information on the cost-effectiveness of a larger range of technologies might help to make a bridge between local purchasing and NICE. For example, NICE could work with local purchasers to identify programmes and technologies for which there exists a prima facie case for disinvestment. It could then appraise these over time together with emerging technologies, in the expectation of providing a more balanced set of investment and disinvestment opportunities.
Conclusions
It is not NICE's constitutional role to determine the value of an additional QALY since the setting of the NHS budget is properly a matter for parliament. NICE, nonetheless, needs a criterion on which to judge the cost-effectiveness of technologies that pass through its appraisal process and it is the search for the threshold implied by the prevailing NHS budget that is the appropriate task for NICE. This will require NICE to grasp the disinvestment nettle and include within its current appraisal process technologies that should no longer be provided as well as candidate technologies to replace them.
